

Scenario Analysis of the Cease-Fire in Gaza

RINT - RENOVATIO IMPERII INTELLIGENCE



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Table of contents

1. Summary	p. 3
2. Report	pp. 4
3. Methodology	p. 6
4. Annexes	pp.
7-12	



1. Summary

Purpose and results of the analysis
- Renovatio Imperii Intelligence ("RINT") has monitored the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following 9-Oct-2025, with the aim of producing a scenario analysis concerning the future of the ceasefire agreed on that date. - The monitoring activity was conducted through the collection of information available from open sources and its subsequent assessment against the formulated hypotheses. - The identified scenario hypotheses are: collapse of the ceasefire ("H1"), warm peace ("H2"), medium-to-long-term peace ("H3"), imposed peace ("H4"). The warm peace hypothesis emerged as the most consistent with the data collected during the monitoring phase, while the medium-to-long-term peace hypothesis proved to be the least consistent..

Scenario hypotheses	
The progressive increase in violations and the crisis of international mediation lead to a return to open warfare. Israel resumes large-scale military operations against Hamas and other militias.	H1
The ceasefire is formally maintained for tactical reasons (external pressure, military attrition, political calculations), but remains fragile. Occasional violations serve to preserve deterrence and to negotiate.	H2
The ceasefire holds and consolidates: violations almost entirely cease, a political negotiation table opens, and the main actors comply with their commitments.	H3
The United States or a coalition of mediators impose stability in order to prevent escalation. Interposition forces or external monitoring mechanisms maintain the ceasefire.	H4
Scenario assessed as most likely*	H2

*at the time of this report, the hypothesis that appears most likely is the one showing the lowest number of inconsistencies with the information collected through ongoing monitoring activities.

2. Report (1/2)

Report

Renovatio Imperii Intelligence has conducted monitoring activities on the events following the signing of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas on 9-Oct-2025. Based on information gathered from open sources, the following report has been produced.

The analysis identified the **warm peace** hypothesis ("H2"—a durable ceasefire characterised by episodic violations) as the scenario with the lowest rate of inconsistencies relative to the information collected during the monitoring phase. Likewise, H2 showed activation of all the predictive indicators (e.g., *episodic violations of the ceasefire; aggressive political and/or media rhetoric; irregular operations at Gaza Strip crossings; increased activity by Iranian proxies*) considered anticipatory of a structurally fragile ceasefire still capable of surviving in the short-to-medium term (approx. 6–12 months).

The monitoring phase revealed a pattern of intermittent tension marked by reciprocal, limited-scale attacks. After each violation of the ceasefire, both parties issued statements reaffirming their political will to restore the truce. This dynamic contributed to reducing inconsistencies with H2, as the political and operational reactions following each incident reinforced the coherence of the scenario. Further elements supporting the H2 hypothesis include the persistent presence of irregular Palestinian forces in the northern sector of the Strip—which limits Hamas's ability to maintain a monopoly over the use of force—alongside the increasingly belligerent rhetoric of the Axis of Resistance (particularly Hezbollah and the Houthis) and repeated Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon.

Taken together, these events and their political-operational developments were fully consistent with the defining elements of **warm peace**, leading to a high estimate of its realization.

The collapse of the ceasefire hypothesis ("H1"—*resumption of hostilities, failure of the peace plan both militarily and reputationally*) displayed a moderate rate of inconsistencies relative to the information collected during monitoring activities. H1 showed partial activation of predictive indicators (e.g., instability of the Israeli executive, failure to disarm Hamas, increase in the frequency and intensity of Israeli attacks on the Strip) considered anticipatory of a collapse of the ceasefire between the parties, both on the political- media level and on the battlefield.

Monitoring activities identified multiple elements capable of undermining the truce between Israel and Hamas on both political and military levels.

From a military standpoint, severe and repeated violations of the ceasefire attributable to Israel were recorded. These violations largely took the form of air raids and were described by the Israeli government as retaliatory operations. At the same time, occasional but significant violations attributable to minor Palestinian militias were identified, sometimes operating outside Hamas's direct control or in ways that could not be reliably linked to the organization's chain of command. Among the military indicators assessed as consistent with the H1 hypothesis are also violations of the ceasefire signed in November 2024 between Israel and Hezbollah. The deterioration of relations between Beirut and Tel Aviv carries the risk of opening a new line of crisis in the Lower Levant, with a potential effect of interconnection and amplification of the Palestinian crisis, as observed in previous cycles of regional escalation.

(continued)

2. Report (2/2)

Report

(continued)

From a political standpoint, pressure from hardline factions within the Israeli executive on the current Prime Minister to resume military operations in the Strip was recorded, along with repeated assertions that Israel has not yet achieved its strategic objectives in the area. In particular, the failure to disarm and neutralize Hamas—together with statements by the organisation's leadership excluding any willingness to move in that direction—was assessed as consistent with the hypothesis of **a collapse of the ceasefire**.

The convergence of these factors led to a medium-high estimate of the probability of H1's realisation. The **imposed peace** hypothesis ("H4"—peace imposed by one or more powers) displayed a medium rate of inconsistencies relative to the information collected during monitoring. H4 showed only limited activation of the adopted predictive indicators (e.g., *mediators' announcements regarding the involvement/deployment of interposition forces; aggressive rhetoric by regional powers vis-à-vis Israel; meetings at the UN concerning resolutions ex Arts. 39–42*), and only limited data were recorded regarding intentions to deploy interposition forces or mobilisations in that direction. Likewise, other indicators revealed no significant correspondences (e.g., aggressive rhetoric by regional powers against Israel).

Monitoring activities found that, regarding the establishment of an international interposition force in the Strip, almost all regional powers had either withdrawn or declared themselves unavailable (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while participation by Türkiye and Egypt would be difficult (due respectively to Israeli opposition and to the *conditiones sine qua non* announced by Cairo). It should be noted that the United Nations Security Council approved a plan that would grant international legitimacy to the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the Strip. As of the date of this report, however, no publicly available information exists concerning the future composition of such a force.

Finally, the level of intra-regional mobilisation observed was not judged consistent with H4. The scarcity of evidence supporting this scenario therefore resulted in a reduced probability estimate.

3. Methodology

Theoretical foundations of the analysis

The present report was prepared using the intelligence analysis methodology known as the *Analysis of Competing Hypotheses* (ACH), developed by CIA analyst Richards J. Heuer and subsequently refined through the use of dedicated software tools, including PARC ACH 2.0.5, which was employed for the analyses presented herein. ACH constitutes a methodological standard designed to increase transparency, robustness, and falsifiability in intelligence assessments

Operationally, ACH requires the identification of a set of alternative scenario hypotheses and their evaluation in light of the available evidence, which is analysed according to its relevance, reliability, and consistency with the formulated hypotheses. The application of the methodology makes it possible to obtain quantitative estimates of the inconsistencies recorded between each hypothesis and the overall body of collected information.

Specifically, ACH requires that evidence be evaluated also in relation to its presumed reliability and analytical importance. This process allows each piece of information to be categorised as highly, moderately, or marginally relevant/reliable. In this case, the resulting evaluation is defined as “weighted.” When evidence is instead assessed independently of these parameters, the process is referred to as an “unweighted” evaluation. Both types of evaluation were included in this report to allow for analytical comparison. By way of example, the difference in the inconsistency rate observed between the H1 (collapse of the ceasefire) and H4 (imposed peace) hypotheses narrows to only 1 point in the unweighted assessment, while exceeding 3 points in the weighted assessment.

This difference is significant insofar as it illustrates the extent to which the findings of such analyses may vary depending on the quality of sources and the risks associated with them. The ACH process comprises the following main stages:

- definition of all plausible hypotheses;
- collection of relevant evidence and arguments
- construction of a matrix to assess t
- he diagnosticity of evidence;
- formulation of preliminary conclusions;
- review and refinement of the matrix;
- comparison between the analyst’s subjective assessments and the inconsistency scores;
- drafting of the final report.

In the present case, monitoring was conducted through the examination of publicly available sources in multiple languages. To identify relevant information, search strings were used in Italian, English, Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Hebrew, Turkish, and Farsi, in combination with major search engines (e.g., Google, Baidu, Yandex). The collected data (approximately 100 items) were processed to extract the corresponding evidence, which was subsequently integrated into the matrix produced using the PARC ACH 2.0.5 software. This matrix (a copy of which is included in Annex No. 2) generated a classification of the scenario hypotheses consistent with that outlined above.

4. Annex 1 – Hypotheses

Scenario hypothesis and predictive indicators

Hypotheses	Predictive indicators	Inconsistency rate unweighted	Inconsistency rate weighted
H1: "The progressive increase in violations and the crisis of international mediation lead to a return to open warfare. Israel resumes large-scale military operations against Hamas and other militias."	- Increase in attacks - Interruption of aid - Breakdown of contacts - Instability of the Netanyahu government - Failure to disarm Hamas - Escalation/hostile actions Israel– Iran - Expectation of Turkish forces deployed in the Strip - Houthi intervention - Ceasefire collapse with Hezbollah - Conflict among mediators	- 10	- 12,1
H2: "The ceasefire is formally maintained for tactical reasons (external pressure, military attrition, political calculations), but remains fragile. Episodic violations serve to preserve deterrence and to negotiate."	- Episodic violations - Aggressive but controlled rhetoric - Intermittent closure/operation of crossings - Interference by the Axis of Resistance - Growing U.S. criticism of Israel	- 2	- 3
H3: "Il cessate il fuoco regge e si consolida: le violazioni cessano quasi del tutto, si apre un tavolo politico e gli attori principali rispettano gli impegni".	- Violazioni nulle - apertura negoziati - investimenti umanitari - funzionamento e operatività dei valichi"	- 25	- 38,5
H3: "The ceasefire holds and consolidates: violations almost entirely cease, a political negotiation table opens, and the main actors comply with their commitments."	- Opening of negotiations - No violations - Humanitarian investments - Functioning and operability of crossings	- 11	- 15,2

4. Annex 2 – Matrix (1/3)

Legend:

C = information coherent with the hypothesis

CC = information highly coherent with the hypothesis

I = information incoherent with the hypothesis

II = information highly incoherent with the hypothesis

Matrix				
Evidence	H1	H2	H3	H4
Severe and repeated ceasefire violations by Israel against Hamas.	CC	C	II	N
Occasional ceasefire violations by Hamas and/or other armed Palestinian groups operating in Gaza.	C	C	I	N
Hamas does not hold a monopoly on the use of force in the Strip.	N	CC	I	N
Israel has not achieved its strategic objectives during the war against Hamas.	CC	C	II	N
Hamas repeatedly declares its commitment to upholding the truce.	II	N	C	N
Israel has not achieved its strategic objectives in Lebanon.	C	C	I	N
Severe and repeated ceasefire violations with Lebanon by Israel.	CC	C	II	N
Invocation of intervention by Hamas in response to ceasefire violations by Israel.	N	N	N	CC
The United States would endorse the resumption of Israeli hostilities if Hamas failed to comply with negotiated commitments.	C	I	I	N
Pressure from hardline factions within the Israeli executive to resume hostilities against Hamas.	CC	I	II	N
Intermittent opening/closure of crossings as a tool of humanitarian pressure on Gaza.	C	C	I	N

4. Annex 2 – Matrix (2/3)

Matrix				
Evidence	H1	H2	H3	H4
Official resumption of the ceasefire by Israel after each violation.	I	CC	N	N
Hamas declares no intention to disarm and intends to maintain control of the Strip for approximately 3–5 years.	CC	C	II	N
Hamas invokes diplomatic support regarding the conditions for continuation of the ceasefire.	I	N	C	C
The United States criticizes Israel's violations of the truce.	II	N	C	C
Major regional actors express general willingness to provide security guarantees to Gaza.	I	N	C	CC
Hamas works to eliminate rival factions in the Strip.	N	C	N	N
Humanitarian aid arriving in Gaza is insufficient.	C	C	I	N
Israel opposes the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in the Strip.	N	C	I	II
Egypt announces that it would not fight for Gaza.	N	C	N	I
Division among the United States' Middle Eastern partners regarding the future of the Strip.	C	C	I	II
The Knesset approves the theoretical draft for annexation of the West Bank.	CC	C	II	I
Iran continues to support the Axis of Resistance.	C	C	I	I
The United States' Middle Eastern partners are hesitant about deploying military forces to Gaza.	N	C	I	II
Israel supports certain Palestinian militias in an anti- Hamas function.	C	C	I	N
Israel vetoes Turkey's participation in the international peacekeeping force envisaged by the U.S.-proposed plan.	N	C	N	I

4. Annex 2 – Matrix (3/3)

Matrix				
Evidence	H1	H2	H3	H4
Possible U.S. veto on Turkey's participation in the international peacekeeping force.	I	C	N	N
The Houthis threaten to resume attacks against Israel in response to Israel's ceasefire violations.	C	C	I	I
Lebanon fortifies its border with Israel, with government attention focused on a possible conflict with Israel.	N	C	N	N
Hezbollah calls for national unity and solidarity among the Lebanese people to confront the Israeli threat.	C	C	I	N
The United States plans the construction of a military base near the Strip to enable the deployment of international peacekeeping forces.	N	N	C	CC
The United Nations Security Council approves the U.S.-proposed plan for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Gaza.	II	N	C	CC

4. Annex 3 – Policy Brief (1/2)

Recommendations for policymakers		
Security policies <i>strictu sensu</i>		Notes and comments
Defence, MFAIC (MAECI)	☐ Improvement and expansion of monitoring capabilities specifically applied to the Eastern Mediterranean: establishment of an internal MAECI observatory dedicated to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	“SLOC”: Sea Lines of Communication
	☐ Strengthening military capabilities related to the protection of the “LCM” particularly between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.	
	☐ Enhancement of coordination between civil and military intelligence systems with regional powers, particularly Egypt and Türkiye.	“SIGINT”: Signals and Communications Intelligence
	☐ Development and creation of dedicated SIGINT listening posts for the curation and selection of information developed in situ, especially in collaboration with the relevant Egyptian and Cypriot agencies.	It is deemed advisable to create the position of a regional intelligence analyst, capable of working independently or in a team on the analysis of foreign- language sources.
	☐ Creation of a joint working group dedicated to the development and systematization of translation and interpreting services for security services, with a specific focus on the enhancement of knowledge relating to Levantine Arabic, Turkish, and Hebrew.	
	☐ Systematization of methodologies applied by intelligence systems related to air, naval, and land traffic (both military and civilian) aimed at monitoring intra- and extra-regional arms flows.	

4. Annex 3 – Policy Brief (2/2)

Recommendations for policymakers		
Political and economic interests		Notes and comments
Energy security and Foreign Affairs	☐ Intensification of the Italian presence and role in the “EMGS” potentially including actions aimed at reviving the EastMed pipeline project, emphasizing its economic and political value to support Israeli-Palestinian détente.	“EMGS”: East Mediterranean Gas Forum
	☐ Promoting dialogue and de-escalation concerning the remaining disputes over land and maritime boundaries involving littoral states, including by offering good offices.	
	☐ Intensification of Italo-Greek-Turkish relations in order to reduce, limit, or eliminate the application of the EEZ provisions established between the Republic of Türkiye and the unrecognized Libyan government in Benghazi.	Hereby the exchanges in the academia, civilian, touristic and scientific spheres are meant.
	☐ Strengthening civil cooperation with the Palestinian National Authority based on Italian cultural capital.	
	☐ Political support for multilateral initiatives, primarily at the UN, aimed at reconstruction and economic recovery in Gaza and the West Bank.	
	☐ Reinforcement of Italian engagement within the “UfM” forum as a regionally relevant platform for dispute resolution.	“UfM”: Union for the Mediterranean

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